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SUMMARY
This publication encompasses the presentation of precedent as a legal category in the context of 
practical (judicial) approach and in the light of the theory of law. After introducing the term “prece-
dent”, which is both universal and relevant to the codified law order, the question of distinguishing 
its particular kinds is described, which appears in the Polish science of law, mainly in the theory and 
philosophy of law. In the practical part, precedent is treated as a part of judicial practice, which in 
case of the codified law order constitutes a qualified form of applying a prior judicial decision. The 
most significant features of this practice are covered within the framework of the legal reasoning 
(with regard to validation and interpretation), which occurs during the decisional process, as well as 
the quality of justification of the judicial decision as regards law enforcement.
Keywords: precedent; the Polish science of law; judicial practice; codified law order
INTRODUCTION
The subject-oriented publication encompasses two parts. In the first one, pre-
cedent is presented as a legal category in the universal and relevant for the codified 
law order context of this term, which is followed by the presentation of its particular 
kinds (in the context of the Polish science of law, mainly, theory and philosophy 
of law). Part two, on the other hand, describes a precedent as a part of the deci-
sion-making practice, which in case of the codified law constitutes a qualified form 
of applying a prior judicial decision, fulfilling the given requirements with regard 
to both legal reasoning (validation and interpretation) in the decisional process, as 
well as the style and argumentative content of the decision justification.
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PRECEDENT AS A LEGAL CATEGORY – THEORETICAL APPROACH
1. Formed within the Anglo-American common law judicial practice, precedent 
has become a present-day universal legal category. This means that considerations 
regarding the role of a precedent may be referred to legal orders other than An-
glo-American ones, including the codified legal order. In such a case, a comparative 
analysis of both ‘source’ doctrinal arrangements and judicial practice achievements 
of the common law order is indispensable.
As a relevant category in the codified law order, a precedent may be considered 
such a prior decision on law enforcement which is applied as a basis of a subse-
quent decision, in the context of both establishing the content of the latter one and 
applying the legal reasoning in the current decisional process, which has been 
performed in this process.
The above mentioned understanding of a precedent does not differ from ap-
proaches that are encountered and well-established in Anglo-Saxon literature. It 
refers to a precedent understood as: “An adjudged case or decision of a court, 
considered as furnishing an example or authority for identical or similar case 
afterwards arising or a similar question of law […]. A rule of law established for 
the first time by the court for a particular type of case and thereafter referred to in 
deciding similar cases […]. A course of conduct once followed which may serve 
as a guide for future conduct”1 or “decision that functions as a model for later de-
cisions”2, “decision which serves as a guide for present action”3 or “decision […] 
that has a special legal significance […] being regarded as having practical […] 
authority over the content of the law”4. This approach also correspondences with 
the definition coined by J. Wróblewski, which identifies a precedent with a decision 
that impacts – in a normative or factual manner – taking yet another decision5.
2. With regard to the latter definition, it should be mentioned that the precedent 
issue has been of interest to the Polish science of law as far back as since the 1960s 
and 1970s, despite unfavourable circumstances that hindered emphasising the role 
of judicial practice in the legal order formation process in the doctrine.
The theoretical approach was particularly reflected in the concept by J. Wró-
blewski, who, apart from classifying various manners of referring to other de-
1 Black’s Law Dictionary, St. Paul, 1990, p. 1176.
2 D.N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Introduction, [in:] Interpreting Precedents. A Comparative 
Study, eds. D.N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Dartmouth 1997, pp. 1–2.
3 N. Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent, Cambridge 2008, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1017/CBO9780511818684, p. 1.
4 G. Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
legal-reas-prec [acccess: 26.10.2016], pp. 1–2.
5 J. Wróblewski, Precedens i jednolitość sądowego stosowania prawa, „Państwo i Prawo” 1971, 
z. 10, p. 525.
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cisions in the Polish judicial practice6, covered other issues as well, such as the 
manner of justification of referring to a precedent (per analogiam and per rationem 
decidendi)7, kinds of connections between decisions (a precedent sensu strictis-
simo, stricto, largo and largissimo)8 and the depth of such a connection. Within 
the framework of the latter question, the Author not only distinguishes between 
the precedent understood in an objective and in a formal sense, but he also dis-
tinguishes the situation of complying with the precedent (when referring to the 
precedent is an additional argument) and following the precedent (meaning the 
considerable impact of the precedent on the content of the current decision, which 
is particularly illustrated in the justification thereof)9.
Developed on the foundation of the civil-law dogma, the concept by A. Stel-
machowski plays a significant role in analysing the role of the judicial practice, 
as it connects the category of precedent with the legislative role that is ascribed to 
the judicial practice10. In the convention related to the theory of law yet another 
concept should be noticed, namely, the one by Z. Ziembiński, which examines the 
law sources in a decision-making approach, within the framework of which the 
position of precedent11 was established, as well as the one by M. Zirk-Sadowski, 
who researched the judicial legislation in the light of the normative novelty theory12.
The last three decades are characterised by a thriving interest in the prece-
dent issue in the context of both position and role of the judicial practice. With 
regard to this, various issues are raised, such as precedent as an element of the 
law sources13, precedent in the light of values of law enforcement uniformity14, 
legislative character of rulings of the constitutional court15 and administrative 
6 See: idem, Wartości a decyzja sądowa, Wrocław 1973, pp. 141–142
7 See: idem, Precedens i jednolitość…, p. 526 and following ones.
8 See: ibidem, pp. 525–526; idem, Wartości…, p. 133 and following ones.
9 Idem, Precedens i jednolitość…, p. 529 and following ones; idem, Wartości…, pp. 140–145.
10 See: A. Stelmachowski, Prawotwórcza rola sądów (w świetle orzecznictwa cywilnego), „Pań-
stwo i Prawo” 1967, z. 4–5, passim.
11 See: Z. Ziembiński, Teoria prawa, Warszawa–Poznań 1974, pp. 83–85.
12 See, e.g.: M. Zirk-Sadowski, Precedens a tzw. decyzja prawotwórcza, „Państwo i Prawo” 
1980, z. 6, particularly p. 69 and following ones to 73; idem, Tzw. prawotwórcza decyzja sądowego 
stosowania prawa, „Studia Prawnicze” 1980, nr 1–2, passim.
13 See, e.g.: L. Morawski, Czy precedens powinien być źródłem prawa?, [in:] W kręgu problema-
tyki władzy, państwa i prawa. Księga jubileuszowa w 70-lecie urodzin Profesora Henryka Groszyka, 
red. J. Malarczyk, Lublin 1996, p. 187 and following ones.
14 See, e.g.: L. Leszczyński, Precedent and the Judge’s Axiological Choices: Remarks on Polish 
Legal Culture, [in:] Unity of Civil Procedural Law and Its National Divergences, ed. M. Sawczuk, 
Lublin 1994, p. 255 and following ones; idem, Dyskrecjonalność a jednolitość stosowania prawa. 
Rola argumentu per rationem decidendi, [in:] Dyskrecjonalność w prawie, red. W. Staśkiewicz, 
T. Stawecki, Warszawa 2010, p. 136 and following ones.
15 See: R. Hauser, J. Trzciński, Prawotwórcze znaczenie orzeczeń Trybunału Konstytucyjnego 
w orzecznictwie Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego, Warszawa 2008, passim.
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courts16 or manners of applying the prior judicial decisions17. The kinds of prece-
dents were also examined at that time – apart from referring to a classic division 
between legislative and non-legislative precedents18, there are also other divisions, 
including de iure and de facto19 precedents, decisive (conclusive) and interpreta-
tive precedents20, binding and non-binding precedents21 or specific and abstract 
precedents22. In the majority of cases, these approaches refer to the Polish legal 
16 A. Gomułowicz, Aspekt prawotwórczy sądownictwa administracyjnego, Warszawa 2008, 
passim; Z. Kmieciak, Prawotwórstwo sędziowskie w sferze jurysdykcji sądów administracyjnych, 
„Państwo i Prawo” 2006, z. 12, passim; D. Dąbek, Prawo sędziowskie w polskim prawie administra-
cyjnym, Warszawa 2010, passim.
17 See, e.g.: as regards the role of ‘judicial quoting’: M. Matczak, Teoria precedensu czy teo-
ria cytowania? Uwagi o praktyce odwołań do wcześniejszych orzeczeń sądowych w świetle teorii 
wielokrotnych ugruntowań, [in:] Precedens w polskim systemie prawa, red. A. Śledzińska-Simon, 
M. Wyrzykowski, Warszawa 2010, passim; however, as regards appointing the court jurisprudence: 
K. Grotkowska, Problematyka argumentu z linii orzeczniczej, [in:] Refleksyjność w prawie. Inspiracje, 
red. J. Kurczewski, M. Żuralska, Warszawa 2013, passim.
18 See: L. Morawski, Główne problemy współczesnej filozofii prawa. Prawo w toku przemian, 
Warszawa 1999, p. 214; R. Hauser, J. Trzciński, op. cit., particularly pp. 10–13, 31–32; M. Zirk-Sadow- 
ski, Precedens…, particularly p. 69 and following ones to 73. See also: J. Wróblewski, Sądowe sto-
sowanie prawa, Warszawa 1972, p. 359 (on the subject of ‘judicial law’).
19 See: M. Zirk-Sadowski, Precedens…, p. 71; R. Hauser, J. Trzciński, op. cit., passim; 
L. Morawski, Główne problemy…, p. 212. Resolutions of the Polish Supreme Court happen to be re-
garded as a kind of precedent, based on ‘the actual binding effect’ (see: D. Dąbek, Między precedensem 
a źródłem prawa (o uchwałach Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego, [in:] Orzecznictwo w systemie 
prawa, red. T. Bąkowski, K. Grajewski, J. Warylewski, Warszawa 2008, s. 198 and following ones). 
However, M. Król, to a certain extent by analogy to this division, distinguishes between formal 
and non-formal precedents (see: M. Król, Precedent and the Law, [in:] Precedent and the Law, ed. 
E. Hondius, Bruxelles 2007, p. 426 and following ones).
20 L. Morawski, Główne problemy…, p. 214; M. Zirk-Sadowski, Precedens…, p. 73.
21 Distinguishing a binding precedent is often accompanied by an expressive declaration about its 
lack in the Polish legal system (see: J. Wróblewski, Precedens i jednolitość…, pp. 528–533). However, 
this distinction at the constructive level is signalised is numerous publications, e.g.: L. Morawski, Czy 
precedens…, s. 199; idem, Główne problemy…, p. 208, 212; idem, Precedens a wykładnia, „Państwo 
i Prawo” 1996, z. 10, pp. 5–12 (whereby the binding question is distinguished from legislation – e.g. 
p. 5); M. Król, op. cit., pp. 425–426; A. Orłowska, Moc wiążąca precedensu, „Przegląd Sądowy” 2000, 
nr 7–8, passim. See: three various kinds of the binding precedent in form of a resolution on the Polish 
Supreme Court: D. Dąbek, Między precedensem…, p. 194 and following ones (among which a binding 
that ‘discourages’ the subsequent decision-makers from departing was distinguished). Various aspects 
of the binding precedent in the common law order, see, e.g.: N. Duxbury, op. cit., p. 58 and following 
ones; M.J. Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent, Oxford 2008, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:o-
so/9780195150506.001.0001, p. 151 and following ones as well as p. 177 (where the concept of ‘super 
precedent’ appears, which is understood as precedents that bind for long and exceptionally strong). 
Various practices within the framework of this issue in selected codified law orders (Italy, France, Ger-
many, Finland), see: R. Siltala, A Theory of Precedent. From Analytical Positivism to a Post-Analytical 
Philosophy of Law, Oxford–Portland 2000, pp. 127–150. 
22 See: L. Morawski, M. Zirk-Sadowski, Precedent in Poland, [in:] Interpreting Precedents…, 
p. 229.
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system as an example of the codified law order, nonetheless, the background of 
such a perspective happens to be related to common law23 or practices of other 
codified law orders24, which provides such approaches with both a comparative 
and a relatively universal character. Comprehensive approaches are also presented 
in the context of either a research issue of the theory of law25 or a law enforcement 
model based on the theory of law26. A plethora of doctrinal approaches led to their 
interesting juxtaposition by T. Stawecki, who distinguished between traditional, 
sceptical, pragmatic, and radical standpoints, with regard to the role of precedent 
in the Polish legal order27.
The Polish legal doctrine approaches are hence becoming a part of a yet wider 
approach that encompasses comparison of both major legal cultures and singular 
European codified law orders, deriving from the analysis of judicial systems and 
manners of applying precedents, oscillating between institutional factors influencing 
precedents, their binding force, rationales for precedents as well as departures from 
precedents (in the light of distinguishing the following practices: distinguishing 
explaining, modifying and overruling)28.
23 See, e.g.: A. Ludwikowska, System prawa Stanów Zjednoczonych. Prawo i prawnicy. Struk-
tura władzy. Spory prawne, Toruń 1999, pp. 49–90; R. Tokarczyk, Prawo amerykańskie, Kraków 
2003, pp. 30–44; M. Koszowski, Anglosaska doktryna precedensu. Porównanie z polską praktyką 
orzeczniczą, Warszawa 2009, pp. 13–110.
24 See, e.g.: B. Greczner, Precedens jako przykład konwergencji kultur prawnych w obszarze 
prawa Unii Europejskiej, „Acta Erazmiana” 2011, passim; A. Orłowska, Precedens w systemach 
prawnych różnych krajów europejskiej kultury prawnej, „Radca Prawny” 2000, nr 5, passim; M. Ko-
szowski, Norweska doktryna precedensu w zarysie, „Zaszyty Naukowe Sądownictwa Administra-
cyjnego” 2012, nr 3, p. 195 and following ones.
25 See: T. Stawecki, Precedens jako zadanie dla nauk prawnych, [in:] Precedens w polskim sys-
temie…, passim; idem, Precedens w polskim porządku prawnym. Pojęcie i wnioski de lege ferenda, 
[in:] Precedens w polskim systemie…, passim. Having both significant and – in some sense – sum-
marising meaning, as it sums up doctrinal achievements and the Polish practice, the publication 
by L. Morawski and M. Zirk-Sadowski Precedent in Poland is included in anthology Interpreting 
Precedents. A Comparative Study (eds. D.N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Dartmouth 1997), which 
analyses – in comparative approach – various aspects of this category in different legal systems, as 
well as in the same comparative perspective in the publication by M. Król, op. cit., passim.
26 See, e.g.: L. Morawski, Precedens…, passim; L. Leszczyński, Rola wcześniejszych decyzji 
w procesie stosowania prawa. Szkic modelu i wybrane czynniki różnicujące, [in:] Prawo w XXI wieku, 
red. W. Czapliński, Warszawa 2006, p. 458 and following ones.
27 See: T. Stawecki, Precedens w polskim porządku prawnym…, p. 59 and following ones.
28 This issue was covered particularly in Interpreting Precedents. A Comparative Study (eds. 
D.N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Dartmouth 1997), in which the following judicial decision-making 
practises were examined: West Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
Great Britain, USA and European Union.
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PRIOR JUDICIAL DECISION AS A PRECEDENT – CONTEXT 
OF THE JUDICIAL PRACTICE
1. The rudimentary feature of the codified law culture applying reasoning based 
on prior judiciary decisions along with applicable laws that constitute a foundation 
for decision content (regardless of possibilities of incorporating the open criteria to 
the operative interpretation process and the normative content of the decision basis) 
is related to the question as to whether the role of arguments stemming from those 
decisions may be qualified, to some extent, as precedential arguments.
It seems that the codified law features lead to a general conclusion that it is 
not justified to assume a thesis stating that arguments of other decisions either 
become precedential arguments in case of each referring to them during a deci-
sion-making process (as well as in the decision justification) or that they may never 
acquire precedential features. As regards the role of arguments of other decisions, 
they are not always ‘merely’ a complementation to stronger arguments related to 
enforcement of legal provisions. The necessity of taking a middle route with re-
gard to such a qualification means that a more precise and detailed answer to this 
question should be based on stating conditions, determined at a general level and 
relativised with regard to the given essential and variable diversifying factors (e.g. 
sort of the branch of the law, kind of law enforcement, level of judicial decision 
instance, kind of decision to be taken or social features of the legal environment), 
on fulfilling of which the possibility of a positive qualification of referring to prior 
decisions is dependent.
Those conditions may be approached in two contexts – in the rationalisation 
and the Socratic method. On the one hand, they are an element of the reasoning 
of a law applying entity, exerting an impact on this entity, so that it states all the 
elements of the decision-making process, including the operative interpretation. 
On the other hand, those conditions, or noticing their occurrence in the above 
mentioned reasoning, become real in the decision-making process, be it oral or 
written one. A positive answer to the aforementioned question is largely dependent 
on their presence in the justification (as well as the justification quality), assuming 
that the justification arguments reflect the reasoning, thus, the decision justification 
– along with the rationalisation function – describes to a large extent the reasoning 
occurring during this process.
2. The problem of referring to prior decisions of law enforcement can be en-
countered at various stages of the decision-making process. Firstly, it is connected 
with selecting reconstruction sources of the norms applied in this process (where 
those decisions occur together with applicable laws and open criteria), secondly, 
with distinctive features of reconstruction of such a norm from the justification ap-
plied in the decision (in the context of both syntactic and semantic distinctiveness of 
this text) as well the structure of the final normative decision basis (where the norms 
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reconstructed from those decisions are connected with norms of laws in force or 
non-legislative norms), up until reconstruction of this basis to the decision content.
In the context of those various roles, it is particularly important that the deci-
sion-making reasoning itself (particularly the operative interpretation – in broad 
terms) is truly and to an appropriate extent based on prior decisions. It concerns 
all stages of this interpretation model, within the framework of which the role of 
a number of proposals should be emphasised.
First and foremost, it is essential that the question of applying a prior decision 
in the current decisional process should be considered at the earliest stage (‘right 
after’ identifying the applicable laws, with a prior decision ‘co-exists’), so that this 
process could be properly located within the framework of the general jurisprudence 
as well as adequate prior decisions that are useful in this process.
Secondly, the choice of the decision should be connected with a ‘preceden-
tial need’, autonomously determined by a court, regardless of the fact, whether 
any decisions have appeared in the parties’ motions or in the justification of the 
controlled decision (even though such an occurrence strengthens this need). It is 
based on a statement of likeliness of judicial situations as well as ‘insufficiency’ 
of a normative regulation, which becomes additionally strengthened, as a court 
operates within decisional discretion circumstances, resulting from e.g. general 
reference clauses.
Thirdly, looking for ‘a decision-to-be-applied’ ought to have the widest pos-
sible range as regards: identification (judgements, resolutions, orders), institution 
(decisions of ‘their own’ court and other courts), instance (decisions of courts of 
higher instance but also of equal or lower instance29) and territory (decisions of 
international, supranational courts, as well as courts of foreign countries which are 
connected by their legal culture30).
Fourthly, the reconstruction of a behaviour pattern (ratio decidendi) based on 
a prior judicial decision should be conducted in a direct confrontation with the 
factual circumstances of the issue as well as in the context of a direct adaptation 
(ratio) to the given needs of the current decision process.
Fifthly, the ratio decidendi reconstruction should allow for a particular style 
of a judiciary statement, which is different than a ‘normative’ style, as well as 
a lower degree of a semantic precision of expressions included therein (enhanced 
29 For various relations within this issue see: M. Taruffo, Institutional Factors Influencing 
Precedents, [in:] Interpreting Precedents…, p. 437 and following ones. For American practice see: 
M. Ludwikowska, op. cit., pp. 61–64.
30 Which is a common practice in the Anglo-Saxon culture (see, e.g.: The Use of Foreign Pre- 
cedents by Constitutional Judges, eds. T. Groppi, M.-C. Ponthoreau, Oxford 2013, passim). See also: 
U. Drobnig, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, Athens 1994, passim; S. Bertea, C. Sarra, For-
eign Precedents in Judicial Argument: A Theoretical Account, “European Journal of Legal Studies” 
2014, Vol. 7(2), passim.
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by ‘foreignness’ of the decisions issued by supranational courts), regardless of 
the fact, whether ratio is formulated as a separate thesis or found in a part of the 
justification, or ‘summarised’ from the lengthy justification.
Sixthly, the structure of a normative decision basis, which consists in an ap-
propriate combination of the reconstructed patterns (rationes), should assume real 
– not formal (ornamental) – application of patterns, which have been reconstructed 
from the identified decisions, even though their involvement in developing the 
basis is merely of a supplementary-corrective character when compared to the 
involvement of patterns based on applicable laws (apart from loopholes requiring 
interference reasoning, normative collisions or normative opening for non-legal 
issues), and the scope of this issue should be clearly set out in the context of the 
particular interpretation reasoning.
3. The style of justifying the decision as regards law enforcement plays a vital 
role in ascribing the precedential role to the prior decisions. Even more important 
than referring to an applied decision and thesis underlying this decision is indicating 
its adaptation with regard to the established factual circumstances and the legal ques-
tions appearing in the process. It allows not only for stating a non-recurrent act of 
referring to a prior decision but also for forming a more permanent judicial practice, 
provided the current decision was to become a precedent for subsequent decisions.
À rebours, both lacking in such an argumentation in the justification and a wrong 
indicating of the judicial thesis or a negligent justifying of the depth between one’s 
own thesis and a prior decision restricts the possibility of stating the precedential 
character of the latter one and, all the more, of forming the precedential practice.
The slightest possibilities of transforming the decision that was referred to 
into a precedent occur when referring to a prior decision exclusively through its 
reference number. If such a reference is accompanied by a quote, particularly, if 
it is connected with an ‘adaptation’ comment, the chance of noticing the prece-
dential character of another decision becomes more likely. The above mentioned 
distinctions also concern applying more than one decision or the whole court juris-
prudence, referring to which – along with providing reference numbers and theses 
of the applied rulings, together with indicating the aforementioned ‘adaptation’ 
solution, would have the strongest argumentative value.
The optimisation programme of the manner and style of justifying judicial 
decisions in the context of openly disclosing their connections with the prior deci-
sions should encompass (along with the aforementioned necessity of an adaptation 
indicating of another decision) a number of indispensable proposals.
Firstly, applying a prior decision should be accompanied by a precise stating 
(explanation and ‘measurement’) of the likeliness range of the decisional situations, 
that is, likeliness of factual circumstances, of legal institutions with which both 
decisions are connected or of applied reasoning of the operative reasoning (in broad 
terms) in both decision-making processes.
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Secondly, the justification should include a precisely identified, appropriately 
reconstructed and generalised ratio decidendi (the major part of the justification 
that refers to the reasoning or the decision content31), regardless of the fact, whether 
the reconstruction consists merely in referring to a clearly formulated thesis (‘put’ 
before the decision text and its justification), a thesis ‘found’ in the justification 
text or an autonomously formulated thesis based on a part or the entirety of the 
applied justification (or justifications).
Thirdly, referring to an applied decision should include the decision content 
(encompassing the requirement of a precise statement of the range of ‘repetition’ of 
the very decision itself) as well as arguments of its justification (encompassing the 
requirement of a precise statement of the course, content and results of the given 
reasoning and statement of their role in one’s own reasoning), as this is the most 
adequate manner to get to the real decision-making reasoning.
Fourthly, the justification should be built in such a manner that it is possible 
to find the answer to key questions therein: why this particular decision and this 
reasoning of the decision-making process have been (or have not been) applied 
in the current decision-making process, as well as to how and in what scope they 
have been applied.
Fifthly, the justification containing the arguments referring to prior decisions 
should be written in a so-called discursive style32, that is, in connection with the 
requirements of linguistic clarity and precision of one’s own formulated thesis in the 
context of the judicial decision collection, a precise indication of the scope, reasons, 
costs and results – not only application of the decision, reasoning or arguments of 
the justification but also lack of application of other potentially applicable elements.
31 On the subject of the precedent decision structure and ratio decidendi construction see, i.a.: 
R. Cross, Precedent in English Law, Oxford 1968, p. 31 and following ones; G. Marshall, What is 
Binding in a Precedent, [in:] Interpreting Precedents…, p. 510 and following ones; R. Siltala, op. cit., 
p. 85 and following ones; L. Alexander, E. Sherwin, Judges as Rule Makers, [in:] Common Law 
Theory, ed. D.E. Edlin, Cambridge 2007, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511551116.002, 
p 45 and following ones; N. Duxbury, op. cit., pp. 58–110.
32 See: M. Zirk-Sadowski, Wykładnia i rozumienie prawa w Polsce po akcesji do Unii Euro-
pejskiej, [in:] Polska kultura prawna a proces integracji europejskiej, red. A. Wronkowska, Kraków 
2005, p. 94 and following ones; I. Rzucidło-Grochowska, Strategia i taktyka formułowania uzasadnień 
orzeczeń sądowych, „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 2017, nr 2, p. 59 and following 
ones; K. Grotkowska, op. cit., p. 55 and following ones (the Author confronts a reporting with an 
eristical style). The example of full discursiveness of the justification may be the ruling of the Amer-
ican Supreme Court on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in the context of both referring to prior rulings, 
including the one concerning Roe v. Wade, and generalisations, including those referring to a justified 
departure from the already established precedent (see: 505 US 1992, particularly, pp. 854–855). See 
also remarks to this ruling: K. Yoshino, What’s Past is Prologue: Precedent in Literature and Law, 
“The Yale Law Journal” 1994, No. 104, p. 471 and following ones.
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The above presented outline of the optimisation conditions refers mainly to 
written arrangements, which are of a formalised character (which facilitates exami-
nation), as well as comprehensive statements, referring to a given decision-making 
process and the decision taken. It seems that it allows for identifying the precedential 
character of a prior decision in a given decision-making process as well as form-
ing a permanent precedential practice, built upon the accuracy and argumentative 
openness as regards justifying the judicial decisions.
CONCLUSIONS
Created for the codified law order, the aforementioned requirements seem to 
have a universal importance, but they also refer to particular decision-making pro-
cesses in the already established precedential practice within common law. Meeting 
those requirements facilitates a real involvement of prior law enforcement decisions 
within the interpretation reasoning, the decision-making process and the decision 
content itself. While in the latter order they illustrate an already formed decision 
practice, in the case of the codified law order they may facilitate the process of 
forming the decision practice, which would acquire more definite and permanent 
features of the precedential practice.
In this context, it should be emphasised that the lack of the stare decisis rule in 
the codified law order does not hinder the process of forming of the precedential 
practice33, even tough, undoubtedly, its form differs from the classic model func-
33 In American literature, accompanied by opinions highlighting the role of the stare decisis 
formula (e.g., R.J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, “Emory Law Review” 2013, Vol. 62(8), p. 1464, 
in which the Author considers it as ‘constitutional ideal of the rule of law’, providing certainty and 
stability to law; W.N. Eskridge Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedent, “The Georgetown Law Journal” 
1988, No. 76, p. 1361; or K. Yoshino, op. cit., p. 471 and following ones), one can encounter opin-
ions stating that the he binding precedent rule does not impact the practice of applying the law as 
strongly, as it is commonly believed. See, e.g.: F. Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in 
the Supreme Court?, “Georgia State University Law Review” 2007, Vol. 24, passim; E.J. Segall, Is 
the Roberts Court Really a Court, “Stetson Law Review” 2011, Vol. 40, p. 701 and following ones, 
particularly p. 715; W.A. Edmundson, Schauer on Precedent in the U.S. Supreme Court, “Georgia State 
University Law Review” 2007, Vol. 24(2), p. 406 and following ones; J.M. Marshall, Stare Decisis 
and Judicial Review of Public Administration in American Common Law System, [in:] Discretionary 
Power of Public Administration. Its Scope and Control, eds. L. Leszczyński, A. Szot, Frankfurt am 
Main 2017, p. 281 and following ones; T.R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the 
Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, “Vanderbilt Law Review” 1999, Vol. 52, p. 617 and following 
ones; G. Lamond, Do Precedents Create Rules?, “Legal Theory” 2005, Vol. 17, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1017/S1352325205050019, p. 15 and following ones (where the Author covers the subject 
of the precedent practice automatism, emphasising case-to-case decision-making with a restricted 
‘verification’ of the accuracy of the applied decisions). Sometimes the roles of this formula are 
distinguished depending on the kind of norms and actions in the decision-making process, the sort 
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tioning in common law (due to lack of this rule). However, taken into account the 
fact that various ‘regional’ models34 can be found within the same order as well, the 
differences occurring in the codified law order as such do not deprive the judicial 
practice of the precedential quality.
Fulfilling certain conditions, in which the precedential practice in the cod-
ified law order may develop properly and acquire features of permanency and 
prevalence35, is of paramount importance. First and foremost, these requirements 
include maturity (content-oriented competence) of the judicial practice, allowing 
for noticing one’s own role (with autonomy and responsibility involved) in forming 
the legal order and willingness to apply one’s own decision collections, formed 
when the given members of the court state the need to refer to particular decisions, 
provided that likeliness of judicial situations occurs. However, they also encompass 
conditions outside the judicial practice. On the one hand, the precedential practice 
formation may be facilitated by an appropriate legislative policy (e.g. ‘opening’ 
the decision situations), a doctrinal support, as well as IT level of the judicial 
practice (enabling the use of the resolution collections). On the other hand, the 
manner of this formation is influenced (to a large extent independently from the 
judicial practice) by the political system type and the collection of binding political 
principles in force, among which democratic principles, the rule of law, separation 
of powers, and judicial independence exert the greatest impact, strengthening the 
formation of a permanent, and a deep precedential practice (which is at the same 
time not dysfunctional in relation to the basic features of the codified law order).
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STRESZCZENIE
Opracowanie obejmuje prezentację precedensu jako kategorii prawnej w kontekście zarówno 
teoretycznoprawnym, jak i praktycznym (sądowym). Po wyprowadzeniu uniwersalnego i relewantne-
go dla porządku prawa stanowionego pojęcia precedensu, rozważana jest pojawiająca się w polskiej 
nauce prawa (głównie w teorii i filozofii prawa) problematyka wyodrębniania poszczególnych jego 
rodzajów. W części praktycznej precedens potraktowany został jako składnik praktyki sądowej, która 
w porządku prawa stanowionego stanowi kwalifikowaną postać wykorzystania wcześniejszej decyzji 
sądowej. Najważniejsze właściwości tej praktyki zostały ujęte w ramach występujących w procesie 
decyzyjnym rozumowań prawniczych (walidacyjnych i interpretacyjnych) oraz argumentacyjnej 
jakości uzasadnienia sądowej decyzji stosowania prawa.
Słowa kluczowe: precedens; polska nauka prawa; praktyka sądowa; porządek prawa stanowionego
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